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ARTICLES 
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION FOR 
HMO TTREATMENT DENLAL, 
John A. ~umbach' 
A chiId is seriously ill. She will not live much 
longer if steps are not promptly taken. However, her 
parents' HMO has denied approval for the treatment 
that she needs. According to her doctor, the treatment 
has a good chance of helping. It could extend her life by 
months or even years. The treatment is, however, ex- 
pensive, more than her parents can pay. Also, the initial 
cost is just the beginning. As long as the child lives she 
will need expensive care. It is a burden that the HMO 
does not want to take. So, a few days from now-maybe 
less-she will lapse into unconsciousness and, soon af- 
ter, she will pass away. Her parents ponder this and 
think: "We've paid premiums to that J3MO for years. If 
she dies now, because of this denial, somebody ought to 
pay; the law should make somebody pay for letting our 
daughter die." 
I. INTRODUCTION 
WH3EN PEOPLE DELIBERATELY do things that are 
almost certain to cause death, and someone dies as a result, 
prosecutions for homicide are normally appropriate. However, 
the administrative conduct of health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs) seems to be an exception. Unwarranted delays and de- 
nials of medical treatment are not prosecuted even in cases 
where the HMO personnel must have known that their actions 
? J.D. surnnm cunt laude, Ohio State University (1966). Professor of Law, 
Pace University SchooI of Law, White Plains, New York 
147 
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would lead to death or grievous bodily ham. This article con- 
siders the basis for this exception. 
Homicide can be committed by commission or by omis- 
sion-by affirmatively doing a lethal act or by omitting to do an 
act that is necessary to preserve another's life.' There is, how- 
ever, an important legal difference between the two: In order for 
a fatal omission to be considered a crime, the omitter must have 
had a legal duty to act: and the victim's death must result from 
a breach of that duty.3 Such Iegal duties may arise in various 
ways.4 For example, a legal duty to provide care is imposed on 
the parents or legal guardian of a child.' Such a Iegal duty may 
also be created by contract, for example when a person agrees 
to provide care for anothere6 Consider the following case: 
' See People v. Burden, 140 Cal. Rptr. 282,289-92 (Ct. App. 1977); see also 
Commonwealth v. Hall, 78 N.E.2d 644,647 (Mass. 1948); Territory v. Manton, 19 P. 
387, 392-93 (Mont. 1888); Biddle v. Commonwealth, 141 S.E.2d 710, 71415 (Va. 
1965) (collecting numerous cases and treatises). See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & 
AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL AW 202-12 (2d ed. 1986); JOSHUA DRESSER, 
UNDERSTANDING C ~ ~ I N A L L A W  89 (2d ed. 1995) (providing an overview of liability 
by omission). 
See, e-g., Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 311 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (re- 
quiring proof of the legal duty); Albright v. State, 280 So. 2d 186, 190-91 (Ala. Cnm. 
App. 1973) (upholding demurrer to indictment that failed to allege the status relation- 
ship giving rise to the duty); People v. Oliver, 258 Cal. Rptr. 138, 142 (Ct. App. 
1989) (noting that there is no legal duty to render aid in absence of a special relation- 
ship); see also MODEL PENAL CODE §$ 2.01(1), (3)(b) (Official Draft 1962) (com- 
menting that "a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law*'). 
See DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 86-89; see also Pope v. State, 396 A.2d 1054 
(Md. 1979); People v. Beardsley, 113 N.W. 1128, 1129 (Mich. 1907) (stating that 
"the duty neglected must be a legal duty, and not a mere moral obligation. It must be 
a duty imposed by law or by contract, and the omission to perform the duty must be 
the immediate and direct cause of death"). 
See Jones, 308 F.2d at 310 (describing "at least four situations in which the 
failure to act may constitute breach of a legal duty," namely, a statutory duty of care, 
a status relationship to another, a contractual duty of care, and a voluntary assump- 
tion of care while secluding the victim); see also DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 89-91 
(describing legal duties arising from statutory duty. status relationship, and contrac- 
tual obligations). 
See, e.g., Jones, 308 E2d at 310-11; People v. Burden, I40 Cal. Rptr. 282 
(Ct. App. 1977) (sustaining a murder charge based on a parent's failure to feed an 
infant); People v. Abraham, 629 N.E.2d 148, 153-54 (nl. App. Ct. 1993) (sustaining 
convictions for murder and aggravated battery based on parent's failure to take af- 
firmative action to protect children from an abusive live-in boyfriend); Common- 
wealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609, 613 (Mass. 1993); State v. Norman, 808 P.2d 
1159 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding manslaughter conviction for parent who 
failed to perform legal duty to care for his son). 
See People v. Montecino, 152 P.2d 5, 13 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944) (finding 
that the legal duty to care for another may be created by contract or moral duty); Peo- 
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D was the guardian of his young nephew. As such, D 
was responsible for the child's care. One day, D heard 
his nephew fall in the bathtub. Running to check, D 
found the child still alive, but face down in the water. It 
was obvious to D that, unless he acted fast, the child 
would almost certainly drown. However, at this crucial 
moment, D recalled that he was his nephew's sole heir. 
With this financial thought in mind, D did not take the 
actions that would probably have saved his nephew's 
life. As a result, the boy soon drowned. In summary, 
seeing a chance to gain a financial advantage at the ex- 
pense of another's life, D omitted to do an act that he 
had a legal duty to do and, by that omission, he hastened 
the death of the person to whom he owed the legal duty. 
In deciding not to save his nephew, D clearly committed a 
homicide by orni~sion.~ He had a legal duty to act, he breached 
the duty, and the child died as a result. The uncle's motivation 
to gain a financial advantage is obviously not an acceptable ex- 
cuse for letting his nephew die. Indeed, financial motivation 
seems, if anything, to aggravate the seriousness of his crime. 
Suppose now that, trying to reduce its medical costs, an 
HMO breaches a legal duty to one of its subscribers. It breaches 
this duty by wrongfully denying treatment benefits that would, 
if timely provided, have preserved the subscriber's life; the sub- 
scriber dies as a result. How is such a case legally different 
from that of the uncle? Certainly there seem to be some salient 
similarities. In both cases, there has been a deliberate breach of 
a legal duty to provide essential care. In both cases, the lethal 
ple v. Flayhart, 523 N.Y.S.2d 225 (App. Div.) (holding that guardians were guilty of 
criminal negligence for failing to care for the retarded brother decedent), affd, 553 
N.E.2d 657 (1988); Commonwealth v. Pestinikas, 617 A.2d 1339, 1344 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1991) (holding defendant guilty of murder for agreeing to provide for a 92-year 
old and then letting him starve to death, knowing he had no other way to get food); 
Davis v. Commonwealth. 335 S.E.2d 375, 378 (Va. 1985) (holding that defendant 
accepted sole responsibility for the total care of her mother and that she had a legal 
duty to rovide the care). 
'See sources cited supra notes 1-6: see also Pinkerton v. State, 784 P.2d 671 
677 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); People v. Stanciel, 606 N.E.2d 1201, 1211 (Ill. 1992; 
(noting that parents have an affirmative duty to protect their children from threat of 
murder and holding that neglect of this duty imposes liability by reason of account- 
ability); State v. Wyatt, 482 S.E.2d 147, 153 (W.Va 1996) (finding that "knowing 
failure to take reasonable steps" to prevent deprivation that resulted in a child's death 
constitutes murder). 
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omission was inspired by a motive to secure a financial advan- 
tage, even at the expense of human life. In both cases, someone 
has died due to the breach of duty. 
There may, of course, also be salient factual differences 
between the two cases. For example, medical patients who are 
so ill that they die from lack of treatment are often so close to 
death that they would soon die anyway, even with all possible 
care. By contrast, the case of the avaricious uncle seems to pre- 
suppose that the young nephew had a long life ahead of him, 
provided only that he was saved from drowning. This is, how- 
ever, a difference without a legal distinction. Criminal liability 
for causing death is not relieved by the victim's pre-existing 
health condition, or the fact that the victim was going to die 
anyway.* "Life at best is but of short durationvg and, given the 
inevitability of eventual death, the law is clear that "[mlurder is 
never more than shortening of life,"1° even if only by a day." It 
is, moreover, always a characteristic of omission-homicide 
cases that there are other causes of death than the omission 
alone. What makes fatal omissions into crimes is, precisely, the 
defendant's wrongful failure to avert such other causes. 
The HMO case presents another potentially salient differ- 
ence from that of the avaricious uncle. They differ in respect to 
the origin and scope of the legal duties in question. The HMO's 
duty is contractual and is subject to stipulated exceptions while 
the uncle's duty is rooted in a status relationship and is rela- 
tively unconditional. However, despite these differences in the 
origin and scope of the legal duty, once it is shown that the duty 
has in fact been breached, the cases would seem legally the 
same. That is, assuming the HMO breached its contractual duty 
by refusing to authorize timely care, the HMO and its decision- 
making personnel would seem to be in exactly the same legal 
position as the avaricious uncle--criminally liable for the death 
See People v. Morgan, 79 Cal. Rptr. 91 1,913-14 (Ct. App. 1969) (holding 
appelIant guilty of murder for causing the victim to die of a heart attack); State v. 
MalIey, 366 P.2d 868,873 (Mont. 1961) (allowing conviction if the "spark of life is 
extinguished by a wrongful act'); cf: Barber v. Superior C o w  195 CaI. Rptr. 484, 
487 (Ct. App. 1983) (refemng to superior court judge's conclusion that homicide is 
the shortening of life since everyone sooner or later will die). 
State v. Smith, 34 N.W. 597,601-02 (Iowa 1887). 
'O people v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353,358 (Cal. 1966). 
" See People v. Moan, 4 P.2d 545,548 (Cal. 1884) (stating that it is homicide 
even if the victim has "a tenure upon life that cannot possibly continue for a day"). 
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that results.'%eath-by-omission should be the same thing le- 
galIy no matter who happens to be the omitter. 
To my knowledge, no HMO entity or personnel have ever 
yet been criminally prosecuted for wrongful delay or denial of 
treatment authorization. It may, however, be only a matter of 
time before such prosecutions are attempted. Already there is a 
growing interest in civil actions for the harms that ensue when 
people, relying on HMOs, suffer or die because benefits are de- 
nied.13 There is, moreover, considerable disquiet about the fed- 
eral limitations on HMO liability that were enacted by Congress 
in the Employee's Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).'" 
However, the ERISA exemptions do not apply to criminal 
laws.15 In many cases, criminal prosecutions may therefore be 
the only effective avenues of redress. 
In any case, criminal sanctions may actually work better 
than mere civil damages to motivate HMOs to authorize the 
medical treatments that their subscribers are contractually enti- 
tled to. One of the biggest disadvantages of allowing civil dam- 
ages against HMOs is that the companies can simply shift the 
burdens of those "penalties" back to the subscribers, in the form 
of higher premiums. For the HMO, the amounts paid out as 
damages in lawsuits become just another cost of doing business. 
As a result, civil damages for wrongful treatment denials may 
actually work against the interests of the HMO's subscribers 
and patients, increasing premiums and diverting scarce re- 
sources away from medical care into judgments and lawyers' 
"See irtfra Parts III and IV. 
" For a prediction that "HMOs may replace big tobacco companies as the 
prime target of the nation's trial lawyers," see David G. Savage, Cost-Cutting Conse- 
querlces: An HMO Liabiliv Case is Being Closely Watclled by the Lawyers Wfzo 
Targeted Tobacco Cutnpanies, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2000, at 30. See also Chad Bowman, 
Special Report: Healtlz Care Outlook 2000,68 U.S.L.W. 241 1,241 1-12 (2000) (ob- 
serving that "the common law is evolving to allow patients to receive compensation 
for injuries caused by HMOs" and that "[iliability protection for managed care con- 
tinues to be the battleground for the coming year"); Richard A. Hinden & Douglas L. 
Elden, Liability Issues for Managed Care Entities, 14 SEION KV-L LEGIS. J. 1 (1990) 
(discussing potential liability for HMOs and PPOs with regard to provider selection 
and utilization management); Linda V. Tiano, Tile k g a l  Zmplicario~rs of HMO Cost 
Cunfai~zme~zt Measures, 114 SETON HALLLEGIS. J 79 (1990) (describing liability theo- 
ries that can arise when HMOs deny benefits causing patients' injury or death). 
'" See 29 U.S.C. 8 1144(a) (1994) (stating that, with certain exceptions, laws 
relating to any employee benefit plan are superseded by ERISA). 
l5 See 29 U.S.C. $ 114@)(4) (1994) (specifying that ERISA does not super- 
sede "any generally applicable criminaI law of a State"). 
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fees. When people subscribe to HMOs, what they are primarily 
seeking is quality medical care, as needed, not a right to get 
cash '%ompensation" after the fact, when life-or-death treat- 
ments have been denied.16 Money is a poor recompense for a 
permanently impaired quality of life or the loss of life itself. It 
little serves the person denied benefits, or his surviving family 
and loved ones, to let an HMO get off with merely paying dam- 
ages, which it can pass on to subscribers, instead of delivering 
the benefits it has promised in its contract.17 
The legal agreements that people make with HMOs are no 
ordinary commercial contracts. The due performance of these 
agreements can be vital to life itself. As long as HMOs are able 
to shift the costs of their breaches, it may never be possible to 
minimize the number of wrongful HMO denials. The only way 
to prevent HMOs from shifting the penalties for wrongful deni- 
als is to impose a cost on wrongful denials that the HMO cannot 
shift. This is, of course, the classic function of the criminal 
law-to impose costs on bad behavior that offenders cannot 
shift. A civil defendant may shift the cost of a monetary judg- 
ment, but a criminal defendant cannot "shift" a prison sentence. 
Although criminal punishment is a dramatic response to 
administrative errancy, the fact remains that it is the response 
prescribed by law for cases where people's conduct proves 
deadly or causes serious bodily hann.18 In the social debate 
about the role of HMOs, our nation's commitment to criminal 
punishment as a tool of social policy must be recognized as part 
of the background. In any case, the deterrent impact of criminal 
penalties can scarcely be doubted: A potential for criminal 
prosecutions would give HMO decision-makers a strong incen- 
tive to treat subscribers right, avoiding delays and unwarranted 
l6 "In choosing a health plan, consumers say that quality of care is their great- 
est concern. . . ." Report to Congressional Requesters, Consumer Health Care Infor- 
mation: Many Quality Commission Disclosure Recommendations Are Not Current 
Practice, GAO Rep. No. GAOIHEHS 98-137, at 18 (Apr. 30, 1998) (report of Ber- 
nice Steinhardt, Director, Health Serv. Quality & Pub. Health Issues). 
l7 AS stated piquantly by Oliver Wendell Holmes, the idea "stinks in the nos- 
trils" that a person who makes a promise need fee1 no compulsion to perfom, pro- 
vided the person is willing to pay legal damages. 0. W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the 
Law, in P ~ S O P H Y  OF LAW 169, 171 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 5th ed. 
1995). 
l8 Indeed, 38 states and the federal government currently prescribe the death 
penalty for lethal conduct under ceaain aggravating circumstances, such as when 
multiple victims occur. See State By State Death Penally Information (visited Nov. 3, 
2000) chttp:l/www.deathpenaltyinfo.orglfirstpage.html> (Death Penalty Info. Ctr.). 
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denials of treatment authorization. In addition, with prosecu- 
tions a possibility, the public could feel much more secure 
against wrongful medical care denials in any situation where the 
patient's life might be shortened or health seriously compro- 
mised. 
In sum, while there are many possible approaches to the 
regulation of HM0s,19 the most straightforward approach may 
be simply to enforce the rules we already have, the existing 
rules of criminal law, the rules to which our society turns rou- 
tinely to address a wide range of harmful activities. First, the 
criminal law has the advantage of subjecting wrongful treatment 
denials to a penalty that cannot be shifted back to subscribers. 
Second, the criminal law is not superseded by ERISA, so the 
current federal barriers to civil lawsuits would not stand in the 
way. Third, as will be described criminal prosecutions 
offer advantages with respect to proof. Medical decisions and 
judgments are necessarily discretionary, and it may be almost 
impossible for a civil plaintiff to demonstrate in an individual 
case that economic considerations played a role, much less an 
improper role, in an HMO's decision to deny benefits?' In a 
criminal prosecution, by contrast, the needed evidence can be 
obtained by such well-tested prosecutoria1 techniques as, for 
example, offering leniency to subordinates in exchange for tes- 
timony against their superiors, the individuals directly responsi- 
ble for forming HMO policies. Finally, as will also be outlined 
below, the criminal law on lethal and other injurious activities is 
rather clear. The only real questions seem to be factual. Did the 
HMO refuse to authorize treatment benefits in a situation where 
there was a legal duty to approve and provide them promptly? 
Were the HMO's decision-makers aware of the risks imposed 
I9 See John V .  Jacobi, Canaries in the Coal Mine: The Chronically I11 in 
hfurraged Care, 9 HEALTH MA= 79, 106-26 (1999) (summarizing a variety of pro- 
posed and enacted regulatory measures). It is doubtfuI, however, that regulatory 
measures can have much effect since they are "always a step behind the latest busi- 
ness practice," while mi0 cost containment methods "are simply too complex and 
subtle to be easily addressed by rigid regulations." Id. at 120. 
20 See illfa Part 1V.C. 
2' "Even in those few cases in which there have been legal claims [against 
HhlOs]. lawyers find that obtaining critical information from a plan is akin to getting 
gold bars out of Fort Knox." li're hfenace of Managed Care: A Guide to How Avoid- 
arrce, Delrial and Control Can Result in Patient Harm, Before the Subcomm on 
Health & Elal*'t of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. (Oct. 28, 1997) 
[hereinafter hfenace of itfanaged Care] (prepared statement of Linda Peeno, M.D.), 
ai~ailable in LE.YIS ( Fed. News Serv.). 
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on the patient? Was the patient's life shortened or health im- 
paired as a result? 
This article will, in Part II, first provide a brief examination 
of the economic pressures that market forces bring to bear on 
HMOs and their decision-making personnel. The objective is to 
show how the natural effect of normal market forces is to exert 
a constant pressure towards treatment delays and denials, par- 
ticularly in the cases of elderly and chronically ill patients. Part 
III will provide an overview of the existing criminal law as it 
applies to situations in which death results because someone has 
violated a legal duty to provide medical treatment. In Part IV, 
the question of the requisite mental culpability will be dis- 
cussed. Finally, after concluding that the criminal law provides, 
in its present state, a rather clear basis for homicide prosecu- 
tions of HMO personnel who authorize lethal treatment denials, 
a short Postscript will consider some further policy implications 
of HMO homicide prosecutions. 
11. THE PROBLEM OF "NET-NEGATIVE?' 
PATENTS 
In the past couple of decades, HMOs and other managed 
care firms have taken on a dominant role in the health care 
field, with for-profit HMOs now accounting for nearly two- 
thirds of the total HMO market." Typically, these corporations 
have acquired the power to make essentially final decisions 
about who receives medical care, what kinds of care they re- 
ceive, and when they can receive it.23 However, "[llike other 
22 "Between 1985 and 1998 the proportion of HMO members enrolled in 
investor-owned plans increased from 26% to 62% . . . ." David U. Himmelstein et al., 
Quality of Care in Investor-Owned vs Not-for-Projit HMOs, 282 JAMA 159, 159 
(1999). HaIf or more of privately insured Americans are enrolled in HMOs. See John 
E. Ware, Jr. et aI., Diflerences in 4-Year Health Outcomes for Elderly and Poor, 
Chronically Ill Patients Treated in HMO and Fee-for-Service Systems, 276 JAMA 
1039, 1039 (1996); see also William H. Nelson, Customers Demand Managed Care, 
HEALTHCARERN. MGMT., Aug. 1995, at 38 (stating that "about 66 percent of insured 
Americans are enrolled in HMOs and other forms of managed care plans"). 'The 
defining feature of an HMO is receipt of a fixed fee for each patient enrolled under 
the terms of a contract to provide specified health care if needed." Pegram v. Her- 
drich, 530 U.S. 21 1, 120 S. Ct. 2143,2149 (2000), discussed infia text accompanying 
notes 24-29. 
"See, e.g., Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 13 I, 134 (D. N.J. 
1989) (noting that the Plan Administrator "retains ultimate authority to grant or with- 
hold benefits"); Menace of Managed Care, supra note 21; Linda Peeno, Managed 
Care Ethics: The Close View (last modified May 30, 1996) 
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risk-bearing organizations, HMOs take steps to control costs," 
and "[tlhese cost-controlling measures are commonly comple- 
mented by specific financial incentives to physicians, rewarding 
them for decreasing utilization of health-care services . . . . ,924 
Indeed, as the Supreme Court recently recognized in Pegrain v. 
Herdrich, "no HMO organization could survive without some 
incentive connecting physician reward with treatment ration- 
ingy2' With this economic need for rationing in mind:6 the 
Court held that, under ERISA," HMO treatment decisions do 
not have to be made "solely in the interest of the participants 
and benefi~iaries."~' 
The obvious attraction of giving physicians incentives to 
refrain from prescribing treatments is that doing so cuts down 
the HMO's medical costs. As the Supreme Court observed, cut- 
ting down medical treatment costs does not necessarily increase 
medical risks-in fact, the Court noted, less treatment may 
sometimes even lead to less medical risk, for instance by cutting 
down the hazards of unnecessary surgery.29 However, unless our 
current levels of medical treatment are, on the whole, more 
risky than they are beneficial, it seems almost inevitable that 
less medical treatment will lead to more overall risk. This con- 
clusion is, moreover, supported by some disturbing empirical 
evidence, which shows that rationing by HMOs may be in- 
creasing the medical risks to various classes of patients. 
<http:ll~ww.harp.orgIpeeno.htm> (commenting that the HMO system claims the 
right to be the mechanism for the most serious of ethical decisions: determining who 
gets medical care). 
" Pegram, I20 S. Ct. at 2149. 
'5 Id. at 2150. 
'% additional concern was to avoid a judicial "upheaval." Id. at 2156. 
27 See 29 U.S.C. $ II04(a)(l) (1994); see Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2155-59 (ex- 
plaining conclusion that HMOs are not acting as fiduciaries). 
'' Pegrant, 120 S. Ct  at 2151 (quoting 29 U.S.C. -$ lItM(a)(l) (1994)). The 
Court reached this conclusion by reasoning that HMO treatment decisions are not "fidu- 
ciary acts," as that term is used in ERISA. See id at 2152,2157-58. If treatment deci- 
sions Itore considered to be fiduciary acts subject to ERISA, then the applicable stan- 
dard for HMO treatment denials would be as defined in 29 U.S.C. $1 104(a)(l). Not- 
withstanding the Court's holding in Pegrattz, the physician-employee's decisions 
would still, of course, be subject to ordinary medical malpractice standards, which 
would continue to apply under state Iaw. See id. at 1257-58. Ultimately, then, what 
Pegrant denies is that an injured patient has "a further defendant to be sued" in a 
federal ERISA action brought directly against the HMO, which "might have a deeper 
pocket than the physician." Id. at 2158. 
See id. at 2150. 
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For example, in the fall of 1996, the Journal of the Ameri- 
can Medical Association (JAMA) reported an extensive study of 
the medical outcomes for patients who had been treated in 
HMOS.~~ The study concluded that "elderly and poor chroni- 
cally ill patients had worse physical health outcomes in HMOs" 
than under traditional insurance plans.31 For example, "[tlhe 
elderly treated in HMOs were nearly twice as IikeIy to decline 
in physical health over time."32 By contrast, younger, healthier, 
and financially better-off patients "did at least as well in HMOs 
as in the [fee-for-service] plans."33 Other studies have generally 
confirmed these results: While HMOs serve the "average, 
healthy enrollee" about as well as traditional health insurance, 
they usually appear to provide "worse outcomes . . . for vulner- 
able groups (i.e., the seriously ill, the mentally ill, and the 
poor)."34 For anyone familiar with the elementary laws of eco- 
nomics, this difference in medical outcomes should come as no 
surprise. 
First, consider the context. Most large HMOs are publicly 
traded on national stock exchanges and, as such, their securities 
are in daily competition with those of other corporations. Their 
financial results are closely scrutinized and compared, by Wall 
Street analysts and others. This public market activity means 
that HMO executives are under steady pressure to keep medical 
- - -  - 
30 See Ware, Jr. et al., snpra note 22, at 1042-47. 
31 Id at 1039. 
32 Id. at 1044. 
33 Id. at 1046. In traditional or "fee-for-service" insurance plans, the insurance 
carrier pays or reimburses for treatments ordered by the patient's doctor or health care 
provider, but does not directIy take a role in selecting providers or deciding on treat- 
ments. See Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2148-49 (explaining operation of traditional fee-for- 
service medical care). As the Court explained the crucial economic difference be- 
tween HMOs and fee-for-service plans: "In a fee-for-service system, a physician's 
financia1 incentive is to provide more care, not less, so long as payment is forthcom- 
ing . . . in an HMO system, a physician's financial interest lies in providing less care, 
not more." Id. at 2149. In both systems, the "check" on these financial self-interest 
influences is the physician's professional obligation to act with "reasonable medical 
skill and judgment in the patient's interest." Id In both, too, the adequacy of the phy- 
sician's professional obligation to counter the economic influences "has been chal- 
lenged." Id 
3.1 HimmeIstein et al., supra note 22, at 159 (citing prior research where worse 
outcomes appeared in eight out of 10 studies). The unfavorable comparisons that 
emerge from studies such as these have apparently spurred HMOs into action. Ac- 
cording to Himrnelstein et al., more and more plans are refusing to release the data on 
which such studies are based. See id. at 163 (noting that 41 plans refused to release 
data in 1997 while 155 plans refused in 1998). 
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costs down and profits up. Otherwise, the price of the HMO's 
stock will fall and the jobs of its managers will be in jeopardy. 
When compensation packages are tied to profits or include 
stock options in the HMO's securities, the decision- makers 
have an even greater personal interest in the financial success of 
their companies and their market valuations. The market does 
not reward them for saving lives at stockholder expense.35 
Looking at the world through the eyes of a rational HMO 
executive, the company's clientele can be divided into two 
groups: First, there are the subscribers who will probably pay 
more in future premiums than they will cost the HMO in future 
medical services.36 This is the "net-positive" clientele. The 
other group is "net-rzegative." It contains the subscribers who 
will probably cost more in future medical services than they 
will ever pay in future premiums. Members of the net-negative 
group include the most seriously ill, those who have only a 
small chance of recovery, as well as the chronically ill people 
whose diseases are both lingering and expensive to treat. The 
"net-negatives" are perhaps typically, though not always, eld- 
erly. Young or old, however, they are the subscribers whose 
medical prognoses make it improbable that they will ever be 
anything but unprofitable business for the HMO, a net financial 
drain on its bottom line for the rest of their lives. They are not 
the kind of customers that a rational HMO manager would nor- 
mally want to have. 
By tallying up and correlating the medical diagnoses, prog- 
noses, treatments, and outcomes of the HMO's subscribers, the 
actuarial staff of an HMO can make fairly reliable estimates of 
who does and does not fa11 in the "net-negative" group. Then, 
whenever a subscriber requests approval for expensive treat- 
ments, the HMO's medical-review staff can check the sub- 
scriber's file and make a straightforward monetary calculation. 
If the calculation shows that the subscriber wiII probably turn 
out to be "net-positive," then it is in the HMO's economic inter- 
est to promptly approve payment for the requested medical 
treatment. This will keep the subscriber happy and, so, the 
HMO will more likely retain the subscriber's business. Given 
3% one commentator has stated: "[Tlhe financing system at the heart of 
managed care is at war with its care-giving potential when it comes to the chronically 
ill!' Jacobi, supra note 19, at 107. 
36 All future amounts being appropriately discounted to present value to ac- 
count for the "time-value of money." 
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normal economic incentives, it is no surprise that the JAMA 
study reported that younger, healthier people generally did well 
under HMO systems.37 
The matter is, however, entirely different in cases where 
the HMO's prognosis-based calculations would show that the 
subscriber will probably turn out to be "net-negative." It would 
not be at all in the HMO's economic interest to extend the lives 
of net-negative patients. That would just prolong a losing 
proposition. The financial problem for the HMO is far greater 
than merely being unable to recoup the immediate out-of-pocket 
treatment costs. For many serious diseases, such as certain 
forms of cancer, prompt and comprehensive treatment can pro- 
long the patient's life very substantially. If timely diagnosis and 
treatment extends an ailing patient's life by, say, five years, 
those five years might mean additional millions of dollars in 
treatment costs to be borne by the HMO. Consequently, when 
an HMO gives prompt and comprehensive treatment to the 
chronically ill, it risks taking on a stream of financial costs that 
can go on indefinitely. In terms of HMO economics, this can 
mean a tremendous increase in the lifetime cost of a subscriber 
who is already a net drain on the HMO's finances. The eco- 
nomic incentive to avoid aggressive diagnosis and time-critical 
treatments of certain kinds of ailments is therefore obvious. 
EconomicalIy rational HMO managers know that their 
company's stock price depends on the bottom line. They know 
that every dollar spent on a net-negative patient is one less rea- 
son why the HMO's securities should command their current 
prices on the national stock exchange. With jobs and personal 
wealth ultimately on the line, the economically rational HMO 
manager can hardly help wondering how to minimize, some- 
how, the financial burdens posed by the HMO's net-negative 
subscribers. The chief financial question that they present for 
the HMO is: How long? 
What particuIarIy exacerbates this somber economic reality 
is the fact that medical decisions are necessarily discretionary 
and never exact. Medical professionals can, in complete good 
faith, differ substantially as to what therapies are called for or 
" See Ware, Jr. et al., supra note 22, at 1042-47, discussed supra at text ac- 
companying notes 33-34. 
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necessary in a particular case?' When this intrinsic indefinite- 
ness is combined with the pressures to minimize the net- 
negative clientele, a potent and scary synergy can emerge. Es- 
pecially in cases of serious illness, there are ample leeways 
within which to conceal an economic biasing or tilt against an 
Hh4O's net-negative subscribers. It is not so easy for an objec- 
tive outsider to say with confidence that a given delay or denial 
was motivated by financial, as opposed to medical, considera- 
tions. Adding to the cover is the fact that only a relatively small 
delay in testing or treatment can make a life-or-death difference 
in a medical out~ome?~ If a company implements its cost- 
containment measures by means of subtle signals and hidden 
incentives within the plan, a deliberate policy to selectively de- 
lay or deny benefits would not necessarily be obvious to per- 
sons familiar only with one or a few isolated treatment deci- 
sions. In short, a quiet and low-key bias against treatment 
authorizations to the net-negative clientele would be relatively 
hard to detect medically, but it could have a very buoyant effect 
on the company's bottom line. This is a tempting combination. 
Even though treatment biases might be difficult to detect in 
isolation, however, they would tend to be felt in the aggregate, 
showing up for example in comprehensive surveys such as the 
38 According to one of the principal authors of the annual Dartmouth Atlas of 
Health Care, "there is no national consensus about the 'best practice' of medicine*' 
and "little systematic evaluation of the relationship between medical services and 
health outcomes." Medical Necessity: From Theory to Practice, Before the Senate 
Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 106 Cong. (Mar. 2, 1999) (prepared 
testimony of John E. Wennberg, Director, The Center for the Evaluative Clinical 
Sciences, Dartmouth College), arrailable in LEXIS (Fed. News Serv.). The "failure to 
evaluate the outcomes of care means substantial disagreement and controversies exist 
concerning what actually works." Medicare: Its Context and Evolution, Hearings 
BPfore the Senate Firrarzce Conun.. 1 0 6 ~  Cong. 1999 (testimony of John E. 
Wennberg, M.D., M.P.H.), asailable in LEXIS (Fed. News Serv.). The Dartmouth 
Atlas shows that, "on a per-enrollee basis, spending varies substantially among re- 
gions in the United States, even after adjustment for differences in illness and price." 
Id. However, "[tlhe results challenge the view that regions with higher levels of per 
capita spending provide higher quality care. Indeed, the opposite may be the case." 
Id. "More  Medicare spending does not translate into longer, or better, life." Id. 
3Y See, e.g., Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625,626 (8th Ci. 1997) (involving a 
patient with "warning signs*' who died of an undiagnosed heart condition a few 
months after his HMO physician, who had a financial incentive to minimize referrals, 
declined to refer him to a specialist); see also Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2147 (describing 
how patient suffered a burst appendix and peritonitis, a lie-threatening ailment, due 
to an &day delay in testing an abdominal mass); Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 
716 F. Supp. 131, 133 @. N.J. 1989) (noting that "time was of the essence with re- 
spect to the treatment"). 
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JAMA-reported research referred to earlier.40 The inferior 
medical outcomes registered by elderly and poor chronically ill 
patients in HMOs might be entirely a matter of coincidence, 
with no relation to the market incentives that surround HMOs, 
or they may be a result of deliberate policy choices. Whether or 
not intentional, however, the effect is the same. It is an effect 
that coincides exactly with the sort of decision bias that would 
well serve an HMO that is trying to cut its losses from net- 
negative patients. Assuming that HMO managers behave in an 
economically rational way, such a bias with respect to the eld- 
erly and chronically ill would be a normal and expected effect 
of ordinary market forces and incentives. 
In some ways these economic realities faced by HMOs are 
similar to those that apply to traditional "fee for service" insur- 
ance, but HMOs are in a particularly strong position to deal 
with these realities. Under fee-for-service plans, the insurance 
company is more at the mercy of the patient's own doctor or 
health care provider. The doctor or provider makes the treat- 
ment decisions, and the insurance company pretty much has to 
pay for whatever treatments are ordered. Even with a growing 
tendency towards enhanced utilization reviews and other cost- 
containment measures in the fee-for-service sector, the fact re- 
mains that a fee-for-service insurer leaves health care providers 
with far more independence and subjects them to much less di- 
rect pressure to keep treatment costs down. In fee-for-service it 
is the doctor's own professional judgment that generally con- 
trols medical decisions, not the insurance company's. 
By contrast, it is both the genius and the great weakness of 
HMO-type managed care that final treatment decisions are re- 
served to the ones paying the bills. Its strength is that it keeps 
the costs down, but its weakness is that it eliminates the checks 
that are inherent in the old and arguably less "efficient" fee-for- 
service system:' "[Ijnducement to ration care goes to the very 
" See Ware, Jr. et al., stipra note 22, at 1042-47, and text accompanying notes 
22-23 & 30-34. 
4' "Each method [HMOs and fee-for-service] creates an unfortunate incentive: 
a physician receiving a fee for each service has an incentive to run up the bill by hr- 
nishing unnecessary care, and an HMO has an incentive to skimp on care (once pa- 
tients have signed up and paid) in order to save costs." Herdrich v. Pegram, 170 F.3d 
683,684 (7th Ci 1999) (Easterbrook, CJ., dissenting), rev'd, 530 U.S. 211, 120 S. 
Ct. I243 (2000). See also supra text accompanying notes 32-33; Jacobi, supra note 
19, at 97, 103-05 (describing how and why HMOs are institutionally predisposed to 
engage in "stinting," i.e., denying patients medially appropriate care). 
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point of any HMO scheme"" and, as doctors and other health 
care providers come to depend more and more on HMOs for 
their own personal livelihoods, they will naturally feel stronger 
economic disincentives to press for medical tests and treat- 
m e n t ~ ? ~  
By resort to various techniques, such as "economic creden- 
tialing" of physicians, secret bonuses to deter expensive treat- 
m e n t ~ , ~  utilization "profiling" and "capitation" (paying doctors 
a set annual amount per patient), HMOs have proven quite 
adept at keeping the most important decisions about treatment 
expenditures to themselves.J5 This is fine for those subscribers 
who are generally in good health and thus likely to be a future 
profit source, so the HMO will want to keep them happy. It is, 
however, not so fine for the patient who needs a time-critical 
medical treatment but whose HMO would be financially better 
off if the patient were already deceased. 
To state the problem bluntly, there is a potentially lethal 
economic flaw in the HMO concept. The flaw is that the final 
say on whether a person gets life-extending treatment is con- 
signed to an entity that can have a strong economic interest in 
seeing the subscriber dead, as soon as possible. The shorter the 
lives of the chronically ill, the less the HMO will have to pay 
for their care. No one would think it fair to hold trials before 
judges who have personal financial stakes in the outcomes. Yet, 
this is precisely the way that the HMO concept is structured. 
That is, arguably at least, a very serious flaw.J6 
Pegrarn, 120 S. Ct. at 2150. 
" See generally Menace of Managed Care, supra note 21. 
See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that HMO 
breached its fiduciary duty by not disclosing its use of "financial incentives that were 
designed to minimize referrals" to specialists). See generally Edward B. HirshfeId. 
Slrould Third P a q  Payors of Health Care Senvices Disclose Cost Control Mecfra- 
rrisrra to Poter~rial Beneficiaries? 14 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 115 (1990) (concluding 
that HMOs should disclose). 
'"ee HirshfeId, supra note 44, at 117-18. Lamented the attorney, represent- 
ing the patient in Pegrant 1. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000). doctors 
"can receive an annual bonus for  rot ordering diagnostic tests." Savage, supra note 
13. at 30. His client had suffered a burst appendix and life-threatening peritonitis due 
to a misdiagnosis and an 8-day delay in testing an abdominal mass. See id.; see also 
Pegram. I20 S .  Ct. at 1247. 
56 See Jacobi, supra note 19, at 131-37 (suggesting partial capitation and other 
"mixed" systems, that use managed care-based cost containment incentives along 
with fee-for-service provisions, for w e s  of especially expensive treatment needs). 
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It can be equally argued, to be sure, that this feature in the 
HMO concept is not a flaw at all. The recent growth of HMOs 
is apparently due in major part to the hope that they can provide 
health care services at less societal expense. A key part of their 
strategy for doing this is that they combine the roles of decision 
maker and bill payer, which gives the HMO both the incentive 
and the ability to say "no" to expensive medical treatment. In 
purely economic terms, this represents the great advance of 
HMOs over the old fee-for-service system. A disproportionate 
share of national medical spending goes for people in their Iast 
few months of life, a substantial skewing of resources to people 
who are about to die anyway.47 The HMOs' enhanced ability to 
say "no" to costly life extension is perhaps (depending on your 
viewpoint) the biggest service that they provide to society. By 
being systematically disposed to say "no" more often, HMOs 
have the ability to keep down the insurance premiums of 
healthy people while, at worst, shortening lives of those already 
near death. If you do not mind looking at things this way, then 
HMOs are the way to go. 
Actually, I believe that, to date at least, most HMO manag- 
ers would not look at things in this way.48 What saves us from 
these hard economic imperatives may be something that femi- 
nist psychologist Carol Gilligan has called the "awesome power 
47 A study in the New England Journal of Medicine reported that roughly 30% 
of Medicare expenditures were spent on patients in the last year of life, with the final 
60 days accounting for about one-half of that final year's spending and the last 30 
days accounting for about 40%. See James D. Lubitz & Gerald F. Riley, Trends in 
Medicare Payments in the Last Year of Life, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1092, 1092-95 
(1993). These figures remained "virh~ally the same from 1976 through 1988." Id. at 
1094; see also Richard A. Knox, Care at End Not as Costly as Assumed, BOSTON 
GUIBE, Apr. 15, 1993, at 1. These figures for Medicare coverage, however, do not 
include most of the cost of nursing home care, which is "an important service for the 
elderly," and therefore probably understate significantly the total medical costs in- 
curred in the Iast months of life. Lubitz & Riley, supra, at 1095. The 31% of Medi- 
care spending would translate to about 10-12% of total national health care spending 
occurring the last 12 months of life. 
For a vigorously argued and less sanguine view of the current state of HMO 
care, see Menace of Managed Care, supra note 21. See also the less sanguine view of 
Dr. David Himmelstein, a principal author of one of the HMO performance studies 
referred to in supra note 22, who reportedly stated, after an HMO industry spokes- 
woman accused him of ''confusing 'analysis and ideology'," "~mly bias is that for- 
profit H.M.O.'s kill people," quoted in Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Reporr Say Profit- 
Making Health Plans Danmge Care, N.Y. TIMES, July 14,1999, at A18. 
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of the irrational."" Because of this "awesome power," the as- 
sumptions of economic rationality made by classical economics 
are overstated caricatures; they do not reflect actual human be- 
havior in situations where powerful non-rational concerns also 
come into play. For example, most people probably place a very 
considerable value on not being killers, even if they can get 
away with it, or on not doing things that shorten others' lives, 
even when the countervailing economic incentives are great.50 
To the extent that Gilligan's "awesome power" prevails, we 
may expect that HMO managers will be exceptionally able to 
resist the strong economic incentives that they have to quickly 
cut losses when subscribers turn net-negative. The problem is, 
however, that this exceptional and "irrational" resistance to cut- 
ting the company's losses may gradually erode over time. Even 
the most conscientious HMO management will not last very 
long if it does not keep the costs down, the revenues up, and the 
premium rates in line with those of their competitors. They are 
ineluctably bound to respond "rationally" to normal market 
Car01 Gilligan, Preface to MAPPING THEMORAL DO~~AIN: A CONTRIB~ON 
OF WOL~EN'S THINKING TO PSYCHOLOGICAL. THEORY AND EDUCATION xvi (Carol GiI- 
ligan et al. eds.. 1988). 
Actually, it is arguabIe whether conduct is properly termed 
"irrational" when people act on non-economic values such as thosementioned in the 
text. RICHARD S. LAZARUS & BERNICE N. LAZARUS, PASSION AND REASON: 
MAKING SENSE OF OUR E~IOTIONS 203-08 (1994). While some behavior may seem 
irrational when compared with what an economically rational person would do, from 
a different perspective the same behavior might be seen as perfectly rational. ?;he 
reason for the apparent discrepancy is that economic values are only a subset of all 
human values and. therefore, economic rationality is only a subset of total rationality. 
From the larger perspective, the main origin of economically irrational be- 
havior (other than pure misjudgment or inadvertence) is the fact that economic values 
and objectives are not, for most people, ends in themselves but only means to other 
ends, other values that people are motivated to pursue in life. Because economic re- 
sources art: crucial to obtaining many of the most important things in life-food, 
shelter, sexual partners, esteem, etc.--economic values generally provide a conven- 
ient proxy for the things that people are really seeking in market transactions. For this 
reason, the economists' postulate that people act rationally to pursue economic values 
is a very convenient simplifying assumption about human behavior, one that works 
well for many analytical purposes and allows the creation of robust behavioral mod- 
els to compare otherwise incommensurable values. 
HouVever, like all simplifying assumptions, this economic assumption can 
generate models that produce si,@ficant discrepancies from real Iife in some cases. 
For example, the value most people place on not being killers, discussed in the text, 
may produce seriously "irrational" economic behavior. It can cause people to deviate 
from model-predicted behavior because it is a value that is not, in many contexts, 
readily commutable to the economic proxies (dollars) that economic theory otherwise 
uses so deftly and successfilIy to compare incommensurables. 
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pressures or else risk being replaced by people who will. Market 
discipline is not sentimental and, if the tenets of free market 
economics are valid, the only HMOs that will survive in the 
longer run will be those whose managements behave like eco- 
nomically rational decision-makers. As competitors seek ad- 
vantage through moral slippage on the question of serving the 
net-negatives, economic pressures to meet the competition will 
fall on everyone else, as well. 
In any case, if one of the very purposes of HMOs is to re- 
duce the overall costs of health care, to prevent the "waste" of 
health care dollars, then at least some treatment decisions will 
have to be based, at least partly, on dollars and cents calcula- 
tions; it will not be possible to keep medical need and financial 
considerations entirely separate, even in principle. Moreover, as 
the economic circumstances of their companies become tighter 
in the face of competitive winnowing, HMO managers may find 
themselves ever less at liberty to make hard economic sacrifices 
in order to extend human life. In short, it would be naive to as- 
sume that the HMO industry can remain satisfactorily immune 
to the normal laws of economics that drive our free market 
economy in general, and make it so strong. As long as HMOs 
are run by self-interested rational individuals, these economic 
pressures must somehow eventually be felt. 
In making public policy, the normal market forces to which 
HMOs are subject cannot be ignored. What the existence of 
these forces suggests is this: The position of conscientious 
HMO managers is not unlike the position of manufacturers in 
"dirty" industries who want to stop poIIuting but cannot unilat- 
erally make anti-pollution expenditures without giving their 
competitors a crucial cost advantage. In these situations, the en- 
forcement of anti-pollution laws is the way that we level the 
playing field, so that those who want to do the right thing can, 
and those who do not, will. Just as a manufacturer may need 
anti-pollution laws to remain competitive while doing the right 
thing, the conscientious HMO manager also needs the enforce- 
ment of laws, such as laws against homicide, to prevent less 
scrupulous rivals from gaining a competitive advantage by in- 
appropriately mixing up questions of medical necessity with 
issues of pure economics. 
To conclude, if the usual assumptions underlying the free 
market system hold true, then HMOs are under constant eco- 
nomic pressure to curtail the net cash drain they face every time 
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one of their subscribers goes "net-negative." Even with the best 
of intentions, an HMO simply cannot, in a competitive market, 
lavish its assets on net-negative subscribers if its competitors 
are not doing likewise. Because economically-biased deferrals 
or denials of treatment would not always be easy to detect, it 
seems logical to attach the most serious of consequences to 
those that are. Homicide is a category of crime that applies 
when people behave in ways that shorten the lives of others. 
When a patient's life is shortened by a wrongful refusal to 
authorize medical treatment, the offense of homicide is legally 
indicated. 
III. VIOLATING THE DUTY TO PROVIDE 
MEDICAL CARE 
It certainly seems morally questionable for health insurers 
to deny coverage for life-saving medical treatments just because 
they cost much. But can a wrongful denial of treatment on 
economic grounds be a crime as well? If it is a crime, moreover, 
whose crime is it? 
The discussion in the remainder of this article will focus on 
the possible criminal liability of HMO personnel who, in the 
course of their jobs, make decisions to deny medical treatment 
authorizations and foreseeably hasten the deaths of persons who 
depend on HMOs for treatment. The goal is to provide an out- 
line of the basis on which prosecutions could be legally war- 
ranted by the aIready existing, generally accepted framework of 
criminal law. 
From the standpoint of the HMO, a failure to authorize life- 
sustaining care to a person who needs it is an "0mission,"5~ and 
a mere omission is not a crime unless there is a legal duty to 
act.52 However, by virtue of their contracts with their subscrib- 
ers, HMOs do have a legal duty to act; they have a legal duty to 
authorize and provide payments for certain medical care-not 
any and a11 prescribed care, perhaps, but at least some medical 
care. It is therefore a crucial threshold question: What are the 
scope of and limits on an HMO's legal duty to provide medical 
care, especially in life-threatening situations? 
- ~ ~ --- p~ ~ - 
" See infra Part III.B. 
" See snpra notes 2-6 and accompanying text. 
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A. Outer Limits of the Duty 
A leading case on a physician's duty to provide medical 
services to atients in life-or-death situations is Barber v. Supe- 
rior Court! Compared with the physician's duties, an HMO's 
duties may be markedly less extensive since they can presuma- 
bly be limited and tailored in the subscriber agreement.s4 Nev- 
ertheless, the Barber case is of interest; it would seem to supply 
the outer limits of the HMO's potentid duty. 
The patient in Barber was a man who had suffered a car- 
dio-respiratory arrest a short time after undergoing an abdomi- 
nal surgery.55 He was revived and placed on a life support sys- 
Three days later he was still deeply comatose, a state 
from which he was "not likely" to r e c ~ v e r ? ~  Tests and exami- 
nations b specialists indicated that he had suffered severe brain 
damage?' Although not "brain dead,"" he was in a vegetative 
state that was deemed 'likely" to be permanent.60 After consul- 
tation with the patient's family, and on their instructions, the 
doctors in charge "caused the respirator and other life- 
sustaining equipment to be rem~ved."~' Two days later, they 
removed the intravenous tubes that provided hydration and 
n0urishment.6~ The patient died. 
The question in Barber was whether the doctors could be 
properly charged with murder and conspiracy to commit mur- 
derF3 The lower court concluded as a matter of law that the 
doctors' conduct, "however well motivated" and ethically 
"sound" as a medical matter, was unlawful under California 
Observing that homicide means simply the "shortening of 
life by some measurable period of time," the lower court judge 
53 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Ct. App. 1983). The case is the subject of an annota- 
tion, see Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Homicide: Plyicia~z's Witlzdran*al of Life 
Supports from Comatose Patient, 47 A.L.R. 4th I8 (1986). 
" See inza Part 1II.C. 
" Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486. 
s6 See id. 
" Id. 
58 See id 
s9 Id. at 488. 
Id at 486. 
61 Id. 
See id  
63 See id. (citing CAL. PEN. CODE § 187 and 3 182, respectively). 
6.1 Id. at 487 (rejecting the conclusion of the magistrate). 
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held that the doctors' intentional acts to remove the biological 
necessities for life constituted murder.65 
The doctors could not, of course, legally claim to excuse 
their actions merely on the ground that their motives were good 
or beneficent. As the appellate court stated in Barber, "the law 
is settled that motive is irrelevant to a determination of whether 
a killing amounts to murder. . . ."66 Nor did the circumstances of 
the case bring it within any of the recognized categories of "ex- 
cuse" or "ju~tification."~~ "Euthanasia," said the court, "is nei- 
ther justifiable nor excusable in ~al i fornia ."~~ Although the ap- 
pellate court was evidently concerned about the "ga between i' the statutory law and recent medical developments," it none- 
theless felt constrained to decide the case according to the "ex- 
isting criminal law."70 It is that "existing criminal law" that is of 
interest here. 
On the basis of its analysis of the existing law, the appellate 
court in Barber ordered the criminal proceedings against the 
doctors to be terminated?' It held that the doctors did not, on 
the facts of the case, have any further legal duty to provide 
medical care to the patient at the time when the life-support was 
rem0ved.7~ The general rule is, according to the appellate court: 
"A physician has no duty to continue treatment, once it has 
proved to be i~zeffecfive."~~ With particular reference to life- 
sustaining machinery, it said that "there is no duty to continue 
its use once it has become futile in the opinion of qualified 
medical personnel."7" These conceptual limits on the doctor's 
duty, "futile" and "ineffective," are both obvious and minimal. 
A duty to help another cannot logically be breached once the 
other is beyond help anyway. The Barber doctors did no wrong 
by merely omitting to do things that would have served no pur- 
pose at all. 
The matter is not, however, quite so simple. For one thing, 
biological uncertainty being what it is, the concepts of "ineffec- 
Id. 
Id. 
" See id. 
Id 
" Id.; see also id. at 488. 
70 Id. at 487. 
'' See id. at 493-94. 
'' See id. at 493. 
" Id at 49 1 (emphasis added). 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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tive" and "futile" are necessarily somewhat relative. As long as 
basic physiological processes continue, revival remains a possi- 
bility. Recently, an elementary school principal returned to 
work two weeks after hospital doctors had declared him dead?' 
A woman regained consciousness and was munching pizza after 
16 years in a coma?6 Adding even further to these bioIogica1 
uncertainties, the court in Barber seemed to define "futility" to 
mean less than literal futility. The test, according to the court, 
was whether further treatment would offer "reasonable benefit 
to the patient."77 
For this purpose, the court invoked a sort of proportionality 
analysis, whether the proposed treatment "has at least a reason- 
able chance of providing benefits to the patient, which benefits 
outweigh the burdens attendant to the treatment."78 Thus, for 
example, even "minimally painful or intrusive" procedures may 
be unwarranted where "the prognosis is virtually hopeless for 
any significant improvement.'~79 Notably, however, the court did 
not appear to think that burdens to persons other than the pa- 
tient, such as burdens to the doctors or medical payors, had any 
proper role in the determination. Only burdens to the actual pa- 
tient, such as pain, were mentioned as proper considerations. 
Where continuing medical treatment is of only "debatable 
value,"80 the really crucial question may be: Who decides? 
Whose job is it to weigh, with fatal finality, the benefits and 
burdens of treatment to the patient? On this question, the Bar- 
ber court stressed the primacy of patient autonomy: 
"PN]henever possible, the patient himself should . . . be the ul- 
timate decision-maker."8' Otherwise, the decision should be 
75 See Steve Shoup, Man Breathes Afrer 'Death' at Hospital, ALBUQUERQUE 
J., Oct 21, 1999, at Al; Scott Smallwood, Life 'as Usual' Precious GI$ for Princi- 
pal, ALBUQUERQUEJ., Nov. 2,1999, at C1. 
76 See Ben Fenton, Woman in Coma for 16 Years Meets Her Children, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 6, 2000, at 5; James Langton, The Day that a Sleeping 
Beauty Woke Up, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 9,2000, at 24; see also Adam 
Gershenson, Tender Care, Courage cud  Top-Notch Grades, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 
1999, at B4 (noting that a woman returned to college after being declared dead 
twice). 
"Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 49 1 (emphasis added). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. In these extreme cases, even a treatment course that is "only minimally 
painful or intrusive" may be considered disproportionate. Id 
Id at 492. 
Id. 
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given to a person who would be "guided in his decision by the 
patient's best interests."'' 
At one point the court appears to accept the view that the 
doctors themselves might be authorized to determine the limits 
on their own legal dutiess3 However, the court also relayed the 
worry that physicians' decisions may not always be free "from 
possible contamination by self-interest or self-protection con- 
cerns which v~ould inhibit their independent medical judgment 
for the well-being of their dying patients."8"n the end, the 
court states that a doctor's duty to provide treatment continues 
until the "patient himself," or, at least, a surrogate preoccupied 
with the patient's own interests, decides that further treatment is 
futile.g5 Nowhere did the Barber court suggest that economic 
interests of the duty-holder are legitimate factors in determining 
whether a patient should receive life saving medical ~ a r e . 8 ~  
The relatively few other cases that comment on a medical 
provider's legal duty to render care in end-of-life contexts geil- 
erally accord with Barber in stressing the patient's interests as 
controlling.87 Although doctors and patients presumabIy have 
the freedom of contract to make different arrangements, the 
Barber case appears to represent, in general, the terms of the 
"contract that the law implies" between doctor and patient. 
" Id. at 493. 
" See id. at 491. " A  physician is authorized under the standards of medical 
practice to discontinue a form of therapy which in his medical judgment is use- 
Iess. ..." Id. (quoting Dennis Horan, Euthanasia and Brain Death: Etltical and Legal 
Consideration, 315 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 363,367 (1978)). 
8.1 Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491 (quoting Matter of Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 
668 (1976)). 
"See id. at 492. 
'"t should be noted how stark is the contrast between the stress on the pa- 
tient's autonomy in Barber and the practice in the HMO context where, by design, 
the patient turns over trzatrnent decisions to the HMO's personnel, whose 
loyalties can be distinctly mixed and whose explicit goals can incIude reduction of 
"utilization" and the "containment" of medical costs. See id. and c$ Doe v. Group 
Hospitalization 8c Med. Serv., 3 F.3d 80 (4th Cir. 1993) (relying on Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co. I .  Bntclt, 489 U.S. 101, 110-15 (1989), and recognizing that ERISA al- 
lows medical plan fiduciaries to have conflicts of interest in which they might be 
required to choose between the patient or the plan, but holding that where such con- 
flicts of interest exist a court reviewing denials of coverage should give Iess defer- 
ence than wouId otherwise be appropriate). 
"See Samo, supra note 53, at 18 (collecting and summarizing these cases). 
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B. Denying Medical Care: Omission or Act? 
One of the most striking aspects of the analysis in Barber is 
the way the court got itself to the question of whether the doc- 
tors had a duty to continue treating their dying patient. The 
court said that disconnecting the patient's vital life support was 
only an "omission," not an affirmative act.** This was a crucial 
logical step: If the doctor's had done an "act" in disconnecting 
the life support, they would almost certainly have violated the 
law; everybody has a duty to refrain from doing acts to end an- 
other's life. However, by holding the removal of the life support 
to be an omission rather than an act, the court opened the door 
to exonerating the doctors from the murder charges. For once 
the conduct was held to be an omission the court was able to 
invoke the "no duty, no guilt" analysis, already de~cribed.8~ It 
could exonerate the doctors by a finding that, given the patient's 
extreme condition, the doctors no longer had a duty to provide 
life-prolonging treatment. 
On the surface, however, it seems, at the very least, coun- 
terintuitive to say the doctors did no "act" to disconnect the pa- 
tient. They or their assistants surely had to pull out plugs, ex- 
tract tubes, and deliberately cut off the flow of sustenance. Nev- 
ertheless, the Barber court managed to conclude that this fairly 
elaborate conduct constituted neither acts nor murder." Essen- 
tially, the court's reasoning went like this: The operation of the 
self-propelled life support devices in question was "compara- 
ble" to manually administering injections or medication. To 
cease manual injections or medication would merely be an 
omission to provide further treatment, not an act. "Hence," the 
court asserted, to disconnect a self-propelled device is "compa- 
rable to withholding the manually administered injection or 
medi~ation."~' On the basis of this assertion, it concluded that 
the doctors' conduct was merely an omission to provide further 
treatment, not an act. 
The court's logic to distinguish acts and omissions may 
seem a bit contrived, though it is probably no more contrived 
See Barber, 195 CaI. Rptr. at 490. 
89 See supra text accompanying notes 71-87. 
See Barber, 195 CaI. Rptr. at 490. 
Id.; see also Glanville Williams, Euthanasia, 41 MEDICO-LEGAL J .  14, 21 
(1973), reprinted in SANDFORD H. WISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL 
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 201 (6th ed. 1995); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF
CRIMINALLAW 282 (1983). 
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than the act/omission dichotomy i t ~ e l f ? ~  A seemingly more se- 
rious objection to the court's logic is that it appears to reach too 
far: The very same reasoning that the Barber court used to ex- 
onerate the doctors would appear to be equally apt to exonerate 
almost anybody who might disconnect a dying patient from life 
support. Suppose, for example, a mere interloper entered the 
patient's room and cut off the machinery "just for fun," or that a 
covetous relative did so in order to hasten an inheritance, or to 
prevent its dissipation in medical bills. Should a court be re- 
quired, at the trial of such a person, to treat the disconnection as 
an omission and to dismiss the charges on the ground that, like 
the doctors in Barber, the interloper or relative had no affirma- 
tive duty to provide the patient with care? It is hard to believe 
that a court would regard such behavior by the interloper or 
relative as anything but "acts," plain acts of murder. 
As was explained in Airedale NHS Trust 1). the in- 
terloper situation is clearly distinguishable from that of the 
doctors: "[WJhereas the doctor, in discontinuing life support, is 
'' As should be apparent, almost any affirmative act can also be fairly readily 
described as an omission, and vice versa Does, for example, a truant student af- 
firmatively "cut classes*' or merely omit to attend them? Obviously, the student does 
both. Examples such as these, which can be multiplied indefinitely, reveal the whole 
actlomission distinction of the criminal law as being, in its essence, no more than a 
beguiling sophistry, a linguistic construct that cannot in itself carry real analytical or 
moral weight. C.' Justice Scalia's analysis demolishing the similarly illusory 
"hmnhnefit" dichotomy in the constitutional law of takings, in Lucas I*. South 
Carolir~a Coastal Courtcil, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024-25 (1992). 
The redly crucial distinction in the omission cases is the distinction of d u ~ .  
Lethal conduct that violates a duty is (with mens rea and proximate cause) considered 
criminal homicide, and lethal conduct that does not violate a duty is not considered 
homicide. However, this distinction of duty in no way depends on the linguistic clas- 
sification of act-vs.-omission. If a person violates a duty, and death results, it is 
homicide whether or not the violation is accomplished by an act or an omission. In 
"actv*-homicide cases, the duty is normally a negative duty, a duty to forbear. 
By contrast, in "omission"-homicide cases, the duty is conventionally de- 
scribed as an affirmative duty, a duty to affirmatively act. Either way, however, it is 
the violation of duty that is the key. If the legal duty is missing-for example, in 
cases of self-defense, state executions or war-lethal "acts" are no more crimes than 
are lethal '"omissions" in the absence of legal duty. In other words, the law with re- 
spect to acts and with respect to omissions can be wholly assimilated to one another 
by simply recognizing the rule that '"ere is no crime without a duty," a rule that is 
just as true of act-homicides as it is of omission-homicides. When guilt or innocence 
is viewed as depending on whether there is breach of legal duty, rather than on lin- 
guistic classifications of conduct, the supposed analytical dichotomy between acts 
and omissions disappears. It is shown to be merely a distracting linguistic illusion. 
" " I 1  E.R. 821 (H.L. 1993). 
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simply allowing his patient to die of his pre-existing condition, 
the interloper is actively intervening to stop the doctor from 
prolonging the patient's life, and such conduct cannot possibly 
be categorised as an o m i s ~ i o n . " ~ ~  other words, the interloper 
obstructs a flow of medical services that the patient was entitled 
to receive, or in any event would have received, while the doc- 
tors merely cease to provide it. Because the interloper's conduct 
modifies a course of events, instead of "simply allowing" events 
to take their course, the interloper is properly understood to 
have done an "act"--quite distinguishable from the mere omis- 
sion of the doctors. 
There is, however, a problem with drawing confident con- 
clusions from the interloper example described in Airedale. The 
problem is that, as portrayed in Airedale, the interloper differs 
in a second (and highly prejudicial) respect from that of the pa- 
tient's own doctors: The interloper had no business fiddling 
with the medical machinery at dl. Therefore, the interloper's 
conduct in disconnecting the patient seems to be a purely gra- 
tuitous or selfish infliction of harm. The same could presumably 
also be said of the patient's covetous relative, motivated by the 
inheritance. It is obvious enough how these factors of gratui- 
tousness or selfishness might tend to pump our moral intuitions, 
causing us to lean against exonerating the interloper or relative 
no matter what. However, the presence of these factors also 
raises at least the suspicion that the interloperlrelative counter- 
examples are rigged. Are we actually reacting to the repellant 
factor of gratuitousness or selfishness, or is there really a sub- 
stantive difference to be found in the distinction between ob- 
structing a flow of medical care and merely ceasing to provide 
one? 
To test the genuineness of the Airedale distinction between 
obstructing life support and merely "discontinuing" it, let us 
suppose a hypothetical where the elements of gratuitousness and 
selfishness are both removed from the equation. Suppose, for 
example, that the life-saving machinery were disconnected, not 
by a mere interloper, but by somebody who was legitimately 
interested (albeit conflictually) in how these valuable resources 
were used: 
9J Id. at 868 (Judgment of Lord Goff of Chieveley). 
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A hospital administrator, pre-occupied with costs, slips 
into the room of an impecunious patient and, against 
doctors' orders, disconnects various life-sustaining de- 
vices owned by the hospital. He does so because he is 
concerned that the patient is rapidly consuming various 
hospital resources, which neither the patient nor his es- 
tate are able to pay for. Although the hospital is con- 
tractually obligated to continue providing the devices 
(i.e., the case is not yet "futile"), the administrator rea- 
sons that it is economically preferable for the hospital to 
breach its contract and risk paying whatever damages 
might be assessed than to bear the certain cost of per- 
forming its contract duties to the patient. 
Even though the elements of gratuitous harm and personal 
selfishness are now removed, the analysis should still probably 
be the same as that of the interloper presupposed in  ired dale?' 
Again, what we have is conduct to obstruct medical care, a per- 
son "actively intervening to stop the doctor from prolonging the 
patient's life."96 Since the hospital had a legal duty to the patient 
at the time the administrator intervened, this is surely not a case 
of "sim ly allowing [the] patient to die of his pre-existing con- B dition," i.e., an omission. Rather, like the Airedale interloper, 
the hospital administrator has "actively intervened to stop the 
doctor" from providing needed care. When a person prevents 
another from giving life-critical assistance, knowing that its ab- 
sence will mean a high risk of death, the conclusion seems ines- 
capable that the one who prevents it is a proximate causer of 
death, if death in fact ensues?' It does not exonerate the admin- 
istrator that he did not personally have an aflimtive duty to the 
patient. He had a negative duty, a duty to forbear from injuring 
'' Compare Commonwealth v. Marcelli, 41 1 N.E.2d 270,271 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1982) (stating that "[olne who intentionally prevents a third person from giving to 
another aid necessary to prevent physical harm to him, is subject to liability for 
physical harm caused to the other by the absence of the aid which he prevented the 
third person from giving") (quoting RESTATE~IENT (SECOND) OFTORTS $326 (1965) 
~vitlt State ex rel. Martin v. Tally, I5 So. 722,739 (Ala. 1898 (stating that "[ilf the 
aid in homicide can be shown to have put the deceased at a disadvantage, to have 
deprived him of a single chance of life which but for it he would have had, he who 
furnishes such aid is guilty, though it cannot be known or shown that the dead man, 
in the absence thereof, would have availed himself of the chance"). 
%rliredale NHS Tnrst, 1 All E.R. at 868. 
47 Id. 
9 9 e e  supra note 95. 
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others by obstructing the flow of essential medical care to 
which they were entitled?' 
The analysis of the hospitaI administrator hypothetical may 
be especially pertinent to analyzing a wrongful HMO denial. 
The position of the errant hospital administrator is very similar 
to that of an HMO functionary who effects a wrongful denial of 
medical authorization to a patient who dies as a result. In both 
situations what we have is conduct to prevent a flow of Iife- 
prolonging medical care to a person entitled to receive it--con- 
duct that Airedale says "cannot possibly be categorised as an 
omi~sion."'~ If the HMO has a duty to provide a particular 
treatment to a patient, the acts of HMO personnel that prevent 
the filfilIment of that duty would seem to be as criminally cul- 
pable as those of the hypothetical hospital administrator. Such 
administrative conduct constitutes affirmative acts that foresee- 
ably and directly deprive a person of life-critical treatments to 
which the person is legally entitled.I0' 
99 See id. Concerning negative duties, see supra note 92. 
lW~iredale NHS Tn~st, 1 All E.R. at 868. 
lo' Two pertinent variations on the hospitaI administrator hypothetical in the 
text are: 
Case I: A hospital administrator tells an orderly to remove a respirator 
that is sustaining the life of a certain elderly patient so that the device can 
be used to save the life of a young man who has just been admitted fol- 
lowing a serious accident. The elderly patient dies because the respirator is 
removed. 
Case 2: A hospital administrator is faced with an urgent need for two respi- 
rators, one to sustain the life of a certain elderly patient and one to sustain 
the life of a young man who has just been admitted after foolishly causing 
himself to be injured in a serious accident. The administrator decides to as- 
sign the hospital's sole functioning respirator to the elderly patient. The 
young man dies for lack of a respirator. 
It seems clear enough that Case 2 presents a stronger case for exonerating the ad- 
ministrator than Case I, but it is hard to say legalistically exactly why this should be 
so. Of course, it would put a different cast on both of these cases if (analogous to for- 
profit HMOs) the hospital's stockholders were economically affected by the choices 
made by the administrator in allocating the respirators, leading the administrator to 
make the selections based on what was best for them. 
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C. The Limits on the HMO's Duties to Provide 
Medical Care 
Even though it is an affirmative act for an HMO function- 
ary to cause a wrongful treatment denial,lo2 the question of duty 
is still crucially relevant to the analysis of criminal liability. For 
unless the HMO has a legal duty to supply the treatment denied, 
the functionary who effects the denial does not factually "pre- 
vent" a flow to the patient of medical services that the patient 
was entitled to receive;lo3 none were flowing or promised in the 
first place. To take an obvious example, suppose a seriously ill 
patient needs life-sustaining treatment and, due to some sort of 
clerical mistake, she applies to the wrong HMO, one with which 
she has no contract. Certainly, a denial of treatment benefits by 
a wrong HMO should not occasion criminal liability: In such a 
case the HMO is merely a bystander and, at common law, a 
mere b stander generally has no duty at all to save others in J need.' Logically, too, it would seem that exactly the same rea- 
soning ought to apply if a patient applies to her own HMO for a 
treatment not covered by the HMO agreement-"no duty, no 
gUilt."'05 Accordingly, the question of criminal liability seems 
to turn, crucially, on the scope of the HMO's duty to provide 
the care that the HMO functionary refused to authorize. 
The legal duties of HMOs to provide medical care are 
based on the agreements they make with their subscribers. The 
scope of the HMO's duties is presumably limitable by the terms 
of those agreements, and they can vary considerably in their 
details.lo6 Different agreements may have exclusions for differ- 
ent kinds of conditions and experimental therapies, as well as 
Io2 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 88-101. 
lo' See supra text accompanying note 100. 
"See, e.g., Albright v. State, 280 So. 2d 186,190-91 (Ala. Crim App. 1973) 
(upholding a demurrer to an indictment that failed to allege the status relationship 
that gave rise to a duty to act); People v. Oliver, 258 Cal. Rptr. 138, 142 (Ct. App. 
1989) (noting that there is no legal duty to render aid in absence of a specid relation- 
ship); Pope v. State, 396 A.2d 1054 I064 (Md. 1979). See generally DRESSLER, su- 
pra note I, at 86-87 (describing general rule of liability for failure to act); LAFAVE & 
Scorn; supra note 1, at 203,211-12 (indicating there is no legal duty to aid another in 
peril). 
105 CJ supra text accompanying notes 71-87 (describing the "no duty, no 
guilt" analysis of Barber). 
Io6 Although it is possible that statutory or common law regulations might 
declare certain attempts at treatment exclusions to be void as against public policy, 
such limitations on HMOs' freedom of contract are beyond the scope of this article. 
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differing decision procedures, payment conditions, arbitration 
provisions, and other variations. Moreover, an HMO's contrac- 
tual duty to provide care does not necessarily run to the point of 
"futility," as did the doctors' duties in Barber. Instead, the 
HMO may describe the outer limits of its duties in less compre- 
hensive terms, for example by committing itself only to provide 
those tests and treatments that are "medically necessary"'07 or 
not "experimental. ,,lo8 
To the extent that HMOs contract to assume less extensive 
duties to provide medical care than those imposed on physi- 
cians, they make it almost inevitable that severe disappoint- 
ments will occur. The resulting discrepancies in legal duties 
make it almost inevitable that occasions will arise in which a 
patient's physician will be duty-bound to recommend or order 
medical treatments but the HMO will have no duty to pay for 
them. The tensions and dissatisfactions that will emerge from 
these situations should be plain. 
For present purposes, however, we need not examine the 
variations on the HMOs' contractual duties in detail. Although 
contractual terms limiting HMOs' duties will present factual 
and interpretive questions in each particular case, their exis- 
lo' See, e.g., Scalamandre v. Oxford Health Plans (N.Y.), Inc.. 823 F. Supp. 
1050,1058 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (emphasis added): 
Furfher, Oxford refers to a provision in [The Handbook] entitled 'Supple- 
mental Medical Expenses Benefits: Covered Expenses,' which reads: A 
Covered Expense is the lesser of the Usual Charge or the Reasonable 
Charge for any of the services and suppIies Iisted below. Such services and 
supplies must be recommended or approved by a Doctor as  medical[^ nec- 
essary and incurred while insurance or an Extension of Benefits is in force. 
They must also be medically necessary, in our judgment, for the treatment 
of a Covered Person's Injury or Sickness for which insurance is provided 
under the policy. 
See also Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., I8 F.3d 1405 (7th Ci. 1994) (upholding 
HMO contract limitation to that which is "medically necessary"); Farley v. Benefit 
Trust Life Ins. Co., 979 E2d 653 (8th Cir. 1992) (using "medically necessary"); 
Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 131, 134 @. N.J. 1989) (using "'rea- 
sonably necessary' for medical care"); Anderson v. HMO Nebraska, Inc., 505 
N.W.2d 700,704 (Neb. 1993) (stating that the HMO was empowered by the contract 
to determine "medical necessity," which included a consideration of what treatments 
were "most cost effective"). 
'08 See, e.g., Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 131, 134 (D. 
N.J. 1989); Scalanzandre, 823 F. Supp. at 1061-62 (in~plying that if treatment was 
experimental, it would not be covered under the plan). 
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tence does not in any way foreclose the threshold question un- 
der discussion here, namely, whether the ordinary definitions of 
existing law make it a criminal act for HMO personnel to order 
a wrongful benefits denial knowing it will probably lead to 
death or serious injury. For purposes of this question it is only 
necessary that a judge or jury be able to find that the HMO in 
question had a contractual obligation to approve the treatment 
that was denied and that the HMO did not follow its own con- 
tractual rules, so that the denial can be considered "wrongful." 
IV. MENTAL CULPABILITY 
Like other homicides, lethal administrative conduct on the 
part of HMO functionaries and managers is criminal only if the 
requisite mental culpability is present. In this section, three as- 
pects of mental culpability will be discussed: knowledge of the 
risks to the patient; knowledge of the legal duty; and the prob- 
lem of getting proof of the requisite mentaI culpability. 
A. Knowledge of the Risks 
The mental culpability for homicide varies with the degree 
of the crime charged. It ranges from the mental states of inten- 
tion or purpose to cause death (typically murder), through 
recklessness regarding the risk of death (typically involuntary 
manslaughter), down to the minimum mental culpability for 
guilt, criminal negligence.lW "The doing of an act, or imperfect 
performance of a duty, toward a person who is helpless, which 
naturally and ordinarily leads to the death of such person, is 
murder, if death or grievous bodily harm is intended; and man- 
slaughter, if the cause is negligence. 9,110 
'" See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE $$ 2.02 & 210.0 -.4 (Official Draft 1962) 
(defining four states of culpability and requisite mental states for the commission of 
criminal homicide, respectively); N.Y. PENALLAW $9 15.05 & 125.W.27 (McKin- 
ney 1998) (defining culpable mental states and the different types of homicides under 
New York law, respectiveIy). See generally LAFAVE & SCOW, supra note 1, at 214 
(describing the various mental states in defining crimes); DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 
467-68 (describing general principles of degrees of mental culpability for criminal 
homicide). Classifications and designations of homicides vary considerably from 
state to state, see LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 1, at 64246, 652, 668-69. The sum- 
mary in the text primariIy reflects the Model Penal Code prototype. 
"' People v. Montecino, 152 P3d 5, 13 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944) (quoting I 
WHARTON'S CRI~IINALLAW 714 (12th ed. 1932)). 
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Despite the strong economic incentives that HMOs have to 
remove net-negative subscribers from their rolls as quickly as 
feasible, we will pass over the possibility that these incentives 
might motivate treatment denials for the conscious purpose of 
shortening life. This does not, however, eliminate the possibility 
of a murder charge for an HMO denial. In general, the law 
treats the result of an act as "intended" if the act is done with an 
awareness that the result is practically certain to occur."' This 
sort of "intention" might be found, for example, in a case where 
an HMO medical reviewer denied authorization for a life- 
critical treatment with the knowledge that the patient's progno- 
sis would be very grim without it. 
Moreover, even a merely "reckless" homicide can be 
treated as murder if the circumstances manifest extreme indif- 
ference to the value of human life."2 Suppose, for example, an 
HMO manager makes a decision to deny life-critical medical 
care for essentially financial reasons, or on the ground that the 
patient's life is not simply "worth it9'-due to advanced age, 
poor overall condition, mental infirmity, net-negative economic 
prognosis, or other invidious discrimination. Such a denial may 
very plausibly be considered to evince a sufficient indifference 
to the value of human life to support a charge of murder. 
In addition to possible murder charges, lesser degrees of 
homicide might apply to deaths that are caused with lesser 
'" See, e.g., People v. Stanciel, 606 N.E.2d 1201, I210 (nl. 1992) (stating 
that to show intent to commit murder "it is sufficient to show that the defendants 
voluntarily and willfully committed an act, the natural tendency of which is to de- 
stroy another's life. Intent may be inferred from the character of defendant's acts as 
well as the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense" (citation 
omitted)); see also MODEL PENAL CODE $3 2.02(2)@)@) & 2102(1)(a) (Official 
Draft 1962) (discussing "knowingly" committed culpable conduct and indicating that 
murder is committed either purposely or knowingly, respectively). See generally 
DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 105-06 (defining "intentionally"); LAFAVE & SCOW 
supra note I, at 216-18 (describing "intent" and "knowledge" as related to crimes). 
'I2 See, e.g., People v. Burden, 140 Cal. Rptr. 282, 291-92 (Ct. App. 1977) 
(afhning conviction for second-degree murder for neglect of child whose death was 
caused by malnutrition and dehydration); People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704 (N.Y. 
1983) (finding defendant acted with "depraved indifference to human life" by firing a 
gun in a crowded bar and by firing at an unknown person for no explained reason); 
Commonwealth v. Malone, 47 A.2d 445 (Pa 1946) (upholding murder conviction for 
defendant who killed another while playing Russian poker due to his wicked disposi- 
tion); see also Pallis v. State, 26 So. 2d 339 (Ala. 1899) (stating that "if the. . . ne- 
glect is of a dangerous kind, it is murder"); MODELPENAL CODE 5 210.2(1)(B) (OHi- 
cial Draft 1962) (enumerating the action and situations where the actor will be pre- 
sumed to have acted recklessly and indifferently). 
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mental culpabilities. For example, a denial of benefits that is 
ordered with a mental state of "recklessness" should attract at 
least a charge of involuntary man~lau~hter."~ The influential 
Model Penal Code defines recklessness as occurring when a 
person "consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk" if the disregard "involves a gross deviation from the stan- 
dard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe" under 
the circumstances."~t defines the still lesser culpability of 
criminal negligence as arising when a person "should be aware 
of a substantial and unjustifiable risk" and yet acts in disregard 
of that risk."' When a medical reviewer who ought to know the 
risks decides to cause a denial of essential medical treatment, 
and the denial triggers a patient's death, there would seem to be 
at least a case of negligence or recklessness and, therefore, a 
basis for charging negligent homicide or involuntary man- 
slaughter. If the person who causes the denial does so with al- 
most certain knowledge that it will lead to the patient's death, it 
would seem to be one of the degrees of murder. 
B. Knowledge of the Duty 
Although knowledge or foreseeability that an action will 
have potentially lethal consequences is a standard element of 
criminal liability for death, it is not so clear that the HMO 
functionary need know the nature or exact scope of the HMO's 
legal duty. In the typical case, of course, the HMO medical re- 
viewer almost certainly ought to know at least the general tenor 
of the HMO's duty to the patient; before presuming to order a 
denial of treatment, she should have at a minimum made herself 
aware of the terms of the subscriber's agreement, the patient's 
diagnosis, the treatment requested, and whether the HMO's 
protocols describe such treatments as indicated for persons with 
"3 See, c.g., MODELPENAL CODE § 2103(l)(a) (Official Draft 1962) (stating 
that a criminal homicide is manslaughter if committed recklessly); N.Y. PENAL AW 
$ 125.15(1) @lcKinney 1998) (defining second degree manslaughter). 
"' S, 2.02(2)(c) (Official Draft 1962); c$ Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 
N.E.2d 902 (Mass. 1944) (holding that reckless conduct is an act or an omission 
whereby the act or omission will lead to a high degree of likelihood that harm will 
result to another). 
""ODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (Official Draft 1962); c$ State v. Wil- 
liams, 484 P.2d 1167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (hoIding that regardless of the individ- 
ual's mental state, if the conduct does not measure up to conduct required of a rea- 
sonable person, the individual is guilty of negligence). 
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the patient's condition. With this information at hand, she 
should be able to infer the HMO's probable duties, as well. 
At any rate, the preeminent case for an HMO-homicide 
prosecution would be one in which the HMO's decision-makers 
were consciously aware that a treatment denial would not likely 
be upheld in court if the HMO were (or could beH6) sued, but 
they went ahead and ordered the denial anyway-perhaps fig- 
uring that a chance of being forced to pay civil damages in the 
future was a financially better risk than the certainty of paying 
right away.l17 
Suppose, however, that an HMO medical reviewer was 
truly under the impression that the HMO had no legal duty to 
authorize treatment in the particular case. Suppose, for example, 
the reviewer orders a denial of medical treatment while fully 
aware of the mortal risk that denial poses to the patient, but she 
honestly, albeit erroneously, concludes that the HMO's contract 
does not cover the requested treatment because it is not, in her 
judgment, "medically necessary." If a judge or jury later con- 
cludes that the treatment was "medically necessary," based on a 
trial with expert testimony, is the HMO reviewer guilty of 
criminal homicide for the death that ensued, or does she have an 
excuse because it was her honest judgment that the treatment 
was not necessary?118 
On one hand, this misconception of the HMO's legal duty 
would not appear to be a simple case of "mistake of fact," 
where an honest error or ignorance serves as a defense because 
the error negates the mental state that is an essential element of 
"6 Bear in mind, the Federal ERISA severely limits private lawsuits in many 
instances. See 29 U.S.C. 9 1 I44(a) (1994). 
'I7 See it~a Part N C  (including a discussion of obtaining proof of such a 
conscious awareness). 
L a t  one think this situation is unrealistic, consider: "Last year a Medicare 
carrier in the St. Paul area rejected a claim-three times-as 'medically unnecessary' 
even though the patient died within an hour of arriving at the hospital." Daniel Eisen- 
berg, Critical Conditiotz, TWE, Jan. 31,2000, at 52,54. Such a thing can easily hap- 
pen. Suppose, for example, a terminally ill patient decides she wants to die at home- 
"there is nothiig more they can do." A few days after going home she has a severe 
respiratory crisis and her distraught family, in panic, call an ambulance. Is an expen- 
sive trip back to the hospital "medically necessary," even though it would, at best, 
only let her live a few more days, until some later crisis finally brings the end? More 
generally, a cost-conscious HMO might ask, when is it ever "medically necessary" to 
perform extensive therapy, other than palliative, on people lingering at the edge of 
death? These end-of-life situations pose legal questions of duty that stubbornly re- 
main even after all of the medical facts are known. 
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the crime in question.11g On the contrary, the reviewer fully 
knew the factual character of what she was doing. She knew 
that her action was almost certain to have fatal consequences 
(the mental element of criminal homicide) but, because she 
misinterpreted or misapplied the HMO contract, she thought 
that such lethal behavior was, on her part, legally permissible. 
The meager law available from the criminal omissions 
context also does not well support the idea that ignorance of a 
legal duty is an exonerating excuse when a erson breaches the 
duty and another's death foreseeably resul ts5 For example, the 
avaricious uncle who allowed his nephew to drown12' would 
probably not be allowed to claim he did not know that guardian- 
ship carried with it a duty to save his nephew from accidental 
death.lu Likewise, the hospital administrator who, pre-occupied 
with costs, disconnected a patient from life support1* should 
presumably not be heard to claim that he mistakenly thought 
that, like a hotel, the hospital had no legal duty to accommodate 
people who could no longer pay their bills. Perhaps such claims 
of ignorance would not be regarded as reasonable mistakes in 
any event, but the point here is that, reasonable or not, there 
seems to be no legal basis for thinking they even would be 
heard at all. In sum, the existing criminal law seems, if any- 
thing, to weigh against giving a Iegal excuse where the HMO 
functionary errs in interpreting the legal duty of the HMO. 
"' see LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 1, at 405-07 (discussing how ignorance 
or mistake as a matter of fact or law is a defense if it negates a mental state required 
to establish the crime); see also MODEL PENAL CODE 5 2.04(l)(a) (Official Draft 
1962) (stating that ignorance or mistake is a defense if it "negatives the purpose, 
knowledge, belief, recklessness or negligence required to establish a material element 
of the offmse"). Knowledge of legal duty is not, however, ordinarily an element of 
the crimes of homicide. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE $8 210.1-.4 (Official Draft 
1962). Furthermore, "3 reasonable belief on the part of the defendant that the law is 
such that his conduct does not constitute an offense. . .[n]ormdly. . .is irrelevant. . . ." 
MODEL PENAL CODE, $2.04 cmt. 3 (1985). 
""ee LAFAVE & Scon; supra note I, at 207-08 (discussing whether liabii- 
ity may be imposed when defendant is unaware of the facts giving rise to the duty). 
But compare the narrow exception recognized in Lutnbert I?. California, 355 U.S. 225 
(1957) (holding that ignorance of a legal duty could be a constitutional defense to an 
omission-otiense if nothing in the circumstances gave any warning or notice that any 
such duty might exist at dl). 
'I See supra text accompanying notes 6-7. 
I" See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note I, at 208. 
'"See supra text accompanying notes 95-101. 
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On the other hand, it would be very harsh if people who are 
required to make life-or-death decisions in their daily work 
were held to do so at entirely their own peril in the event they 
were to misapply a contract. It would be not only harsh, but it 
would be a bad policy for the public, as well. After all, we 
should not as a society want to drive reasonable and conscien- 
tious people out of the HMO business entirely. That is, how- 
ever, exactly what we ought to expect to happen if ep-ors in 
medical judgment, or medico-economic judgment, were to put 
the decision-makers in personal peril of prosecution. 
When lethal administrative errors occur in the HMO ap- 
proval process, it therefore seems to make sense to allow an ac- 
commodation for cases of good faith mistake, similar to that 
allowed in cases of mistaken self-defense. Under the law of 
self-defense, it can be legal to kill a erfectly innocent person P who is posing no menace to anyone1 provided that the killer 
actually believes125 that the use of deadly force is necessary for 
self-protection from serious harm or death.'26 That is, the law 
leaves a margin of safety to allow people to act in borderline 
cases. 
Similarly, whether or not a treatment for a particular con- 
dition is "medically necessary" is a class of judgment that 
lZ4 See, e.g., People v. Adams, 491 N.E.2d 54 @I. App. Ct. 1972) (finding 
defendant not guilty of involuntary manslaughter when a bullet he fired passed 
through the body of an attacker and killed an innocent victim). See generally LAFAVE 
& SCOTT, supra note I, at 457-58 (indicating that self-defense requires the defendant 
to honestly believe in the necessity of using force, even if he is mistaken in that be- 
lief). 
See MODELPENAL CODE 5 3.04(b) (Official Draft 1962) (deadly force not 
justifiable unless actor believes such force is necessary for self-protection). Most say 
the defendant must also reasonably believe. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL AW 5 35.15(2) 
(McKinney 1998) (requiring reasonable belief in a reasonable necessity of deadly 
force); see also United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222 @.C. Cir. 1973) (stating 
rule requiring reasonable belief of imminent peril); People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 
50-51 (N.Y. 1986) (concluding that an objective standard should be used to deter- 
mine if the actor reasonably believed use of deadly force was necessary). See gener- 
ally L A W E  & SCOTT, supra note 1, at 457-58 (discussing the requirement that the 
defendant's belief in the necessity of using force be reasonable and honest). 
126 See LAFAVE & SCOIT, supra note 1, at 45758. There may also be other 
conditions attached to the defense, such as the unavailability of a safe retreat or that 
the killer not be the original aggressor, but none of these conditions changes the fact 
that the law of self-defense justifies the killing of innocent people under certain cir- 
cumstances, one of which is a (reasonable) belief in the necessity. See general[\- id. at 
459-61 (noting what constitutes lawfi,~l and unlawful force and the necessity to re- 
treat). 
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surely has many borderline cases, where the conclusions and 
judgments of reasonable experts may differ. Surely, too, there 
are many cases when the medical necessity is not borderline, 
situations in which it is almost certain that certain well- 
established treatments will help and, without them, the patient 
will die or grievously suffer. In the borderline situations, the 
case for allowing a legal excuse for wrongful denials seems 
strong. In the noiz-borderline situations, however, where the 
reasonable persons in the field would find the "medical neces- 
sity" to be clear, the matter is entirely different; there is no 
more warrant for excusing a lethal "error of judgment" in such 
cases than there is to excuse the lethal error in judgment of a 
truck driver in traffic who urposely steers onto a crowded 
sidewalk to avoid being lateF7 Once a jury finds that reason- 
able people with suitable educational background and training 
could not differ on medical necessity, conviction would seem 
proper as a matter of course. 
C. Getting Proof of Mental Culpability 
The decisions of HMOs in individual cases and the policies 
and directions that guide those decisions are normally made in- 
ternally; the elements that go into these decisions, policies and 
direction, be they proper or improper-culpable or not-lie 
largely outside the ken of external observers. Nevertheless, in 
prosecutions of lower level medical reviewers and similar per- 
sonnel, proof of the crucial mental elements of criminal liabil- 
ity-such as knowledge of the deadly risk of a denial-should 
pose no special prosecutorial difficulties. The accused could 
hardly deny having had knowledge of the key facts that show 
awareness of the risk: the patient's condition and prognosis, the 
recommendations of the treating physician, the HMO's internal 
guidelines, and customary medical practices. If a medical re- 
viewer were to maintain that she withheld medical treatment 
without such knowledge, it would be tantamount to admitting 
extreme recklessness. Getting proof of the managerial direction 
and mental culpabilities of people higher up in the organization 
is more intricate, but essentially the task is the same as that of 
'''See People v. Gomez, 478 N.E.2d 759 (N.Y. 1985) (affirming defendant's 
conviction for murder based on an objective assessment of the degree of risk pre- 
sented when he erroneously drove car on sidewalk killing two chiIdren). 
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obtaining mental-state evidence in any case of organization- 
based criminality. 
Suppose, for example, a prosecutor is looking for evidence 
to show that an HMO's management has deliberately put poli- 
cies into place to cause time lags in the approval process for 
certain tests and treatments-with the foreseeable effect that 
patients having certain conditions and ailments would often not 
get approvals for treatment in time to make a life-saving differ- 
ence. Remember that a relatively short delay of treatment can be 
enough to shorten a 1ife.l2' To obtain evidence of deliberate de- 
lay policies, a prosecutor could first bring in the medical re- 
viewers who were immediately and visibly responsible for de- 
laying or denying the authorization of life-critical treatments in 
one or more cases. The legal accusations and personal risk of 
conviction could be explained, along with the advantages of co- 
operating. Specifically, the prosecutor could request that, in ex- 
change for leniency or immunity, these lower-level functionar- 
ies provide testimony with respect to the internal policies of 
their company, instructions received from their superiors, the 
performance criteria by which employees are judged, the pat- 
terns of approval and denial fostered among the medical review 
staff, and the like. 
By working "up the ladder" with successive interviews of 
this sort, a resourceful and motivated prosecution could take the 
case right up to the high-level locus of actual policy formation. 
In fact, getting the needed evidence of managerial-level culpa- 
bility may be even easier in the case of HMOs than in other 
multiparty criminal cases because the lower-level personnel in- 
volved are likely to be less nonchalant about the prospect of 
imprisonment than more traditional criminal actors; they may, 
that is, be relatively more amenable to cooperating with the 
government.'29 
Iz8 See Ware, Jr. et al., supra note 22, at 1043-44 (discussing the effect of 
time on health). 
Iz9 For my own part, it should be said, I do not approve of these essentially 
extortionate governmental tactics for obtaining evidence, and X do not personally 
consider the evidence obtained by them to be especially reliable. Accord United 
States v. Singleton, 144 E3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that the use of such 
techniques violates federal laws against bribing witnesses), rev'd, United States v. 
Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999). However, the use of investigative duress 
to collect evidence is apparently commonplace, and most American courts, including 
the U.S. Supreme Court, apparently regard such governmental behavior as accept- 
able. See, e.g., United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. de- 
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POSTSCRIPT 
When people do things that they know are almost certain to 
have lethal consequences, and death results, criminal prosecu- 
tion for homicide is normally called for. The existing criminal 
law provides no obvious reason why there should be an excep- 
tion for actions by HMO functionaries who prevent their com- 
panies from performing their legal duties to authorize and pay 
for critical medical care. Under the law's prevailing categories 
and definitions, prosecutions of HMO personnel for wrongful 
treatment denials appears to be logically indicated in cases 
where death or serious medical injury was foreseeable, and 
death actually results. To prosecute in such cases would be a 
straightforward application of the principle that, when death is 
foreseeable, lethal behavior is a crime. The fact that the lethal 
behavior may be a "rational" response to pressing economic 
forces would not, under ordinary criminal law, constitute an ex- 
cuse or defense. 
However, the economic pressures that bear on HMOs and 
their managements are not entirely an unintended consequence 
of the HMO structure or unanticipated accidents that no one 
could foresee, nor do they work in isolation on the HMO indus- 
try. The view is apparently held by many that fewer of our re- 
sources should go to medical treatments, so that more will be 
left over for other things.130 In any case, the economic pressures 
on HMOs do not arise ex rtihilo. Rather, they are the manifesta- 
tions of values and priorities that are exerted by society as a 
whole. The HMO industry only happens to be the locus where 
nied, ,527 U.S. 1024 (1999); cf: Ilodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778 (OWa. Crim. App. 2000) 
(adopting discovery procedures to assure full discIosure when jailhouse informants 
are used as witnesses). See Frank 0. Bou-man, IJI, Departing is Such Sweet Sorrow: 
A Year of J~idicial Resolt on "Substantial Assistance" Departures Follolvs a Decade 
of Prosec~~rorial I~zdiscipline, 24 STETSON L.REV. 7,64 (1999). At least it is a better 
way to obtain evidence than the use of physical torture, which the Supreme Court has 
also recently let stand. See People v. Hanna, 567 N.W.2d 12 (Mich. App. 1997). cert. 
denied, Hanna v. Michigan, 120 S. Ct. 970 (2000) (upholding infliction of temporar- 
ily incapacitating pain in order to permit withdrawal of blood sample). 
'" As one commentator stated this point, somewhat disparagingly, "if Granny 
were dead then Johnny could go to college." Nancy W. Dickey, E~ithanasia: A Con- 
cept ll%osc. Tir~ze Has Come? 8 ISSUES IN LAW & MED. 521 (Mar. 22, 1993). Alterna- 
tively, one could say, "if Granny were dead, then 10 very sick children, currently 
uninsured, could receive treatments that would save their lives." A third option might 
k. "if Granny were dead, then her health insurance company would have higher 
earnings-per-share." These issues are not simple. 
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these pressures have a particularly visible impact. If HMO man- 
agers were in fact never influenced by the economic pressures 
they feel to contain the costs of medical treatments, if they 
never said "no" to the less promising therapies in less salvage- 
able cases, they would not be doing the job that society has ar- 
guably charged them with doing. 
In short, by allowing and even encouraging the delivery of 
medical services via the modern HMO/managed care format, 
society may be saying that it wants its medical care to be pro- 
vided and financed under conditions that cannot possibly pay 
the cost of saving every life from avoidable foreshortening. If 
so, then it is society in aggregate which has decided that some 
''life-saving" must be foregone, that some lives are simply not 
worth the cost, and that, in consequence, lethal treatment deci- 
sions must sometimes be made. The people on the front lines of 
these fatal decisions are, in the final analysis, only doing the 
bidding of others. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes once wrote: "The life of the law 
has not been logic: it has been e~per ience.~"~~ In other words, if 
the application of legal ruIes is not "experienced" as being right, 
if legal outcomes do not "feel" right when put into practice, 
then the Iogic must yield to the experiences that contradict it. If 
the idea of homicide prosecutions for HMO managers seems 
repellant, even when they appear to be logically indicated by 
the existing categories of the law, then something must be 
wrong with the law. There must be something additional and 
decisive in the mix of considerations that affects the way that 
we "experience" such results. 
In the case of homicide and HMOs, the most obvious "ad- 
ditional" factors are the considerations of social position and 
distinction, which can subtly enter human moral calculus. 
Criminal sanctions in this country are not primarily aimed at 
people like HMO managers and administrative personnel, but 
are mostly intended for a very different segment of ~ 0 c i e t y . I ~ ~  
13' OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, T m  COMMON LAW 1 (1 923). 
'" For example, it has been pointed out that approximately 70-754 of the 
people locked away in the New York State's prison system come from just seven 
neighborhoods in New York City-among the poorest in the state. See Alexandra 
Marks, N.Y. Prison Religion Program Helps Turn Lives Around, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Mar. 11,  1997, at 1; Susan S. Lang, Help For Neighborhoods, CHILDREN 
TODAY, Dec. 22, 1993, at 16 (discussing how neighborhood alliances may be a solu- 
tion to problems in the poorest areas of New York); Francis X. Clines, Ex-lnmates 
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As long as the punishments for homicide are limited to the 
"kinds" of conduct and people to which they are usually ap- 
plied, the rest of us can live tolerably with the deliberate inflic- 
tions of human suffering that their application entails. When it 
is suggested, however, that these punishments be applied more 
evenly, extending also to the lethal activity of classes that the 
legislator may not have envisioned, we are tempted to suspect 
that the law's logic has gone awry. We are put on the alert to 
find ways to make exceptions. 
Perhaps, however, this particular dissonance between expe- 
rience and law goes deeper, lying beyond the reach of resolution 
by mere exceptions. Perhaps, instead, it is that the purposeful 
infliction of human suffering is itself a morally dubious way to 
deal with social problems, and only when we contemplate ex- 
tending it beyond the usual targets do we truly comprehend its 
horror. 
Urge Retun~ to Areas of Crime to Help, N.Y. TI~IES, Dec. 23, 1992, at Al. Cf: PeopIe 
v. Warner-hbea Co., 414 N.E.2d 660,664 n.1 (N.Y. 1980), observing that there 
are "tenable arguments for and against" applying the existing homicide laws to deaths 
caused in manufacturing operations. 
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